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1 Introduction
Many development scholars in India see the recently
enacted the Right to Information (RTI) as a tool to
ensure transparency and accountability in the day-to-
day functioning of government. The poor so far have
been denied basic rights and necessities ‘through a
web of lies based on information that is quoted but
never revealed’ (Roy et al. 2006). In this context, legal
tools like the RTI and other supporting mechanisms,
such as public hearings and public audits, have
‘eroded the social acceptability of corruption’ (Roy et
al. 2007). The RTI has emerged centre-stage in
societal actors’ demands for direct accountability.
In this article, the question I seek to answer is: How
and to what extent can tools like the RTI be a means
of ensuring transparency and accountability? A
related question is: Does the RTI have the potential
to be a tool for collective action by poor people?
These questions are important because ensuring
accountability seems to be key to improving
governance as well as service delivery (World Bank
2003). Yet there is a lack of analytical debate on the
use of RTI as an alternative mechanism of ensuring
accountability by societal actors. On the one hand,
there has been an enthusiastic portrayal of RTI as a
tool to ensure accountability, not simply through the
provisioning of information alone, but as precursor
to supporting mechanisms like public hearings and
public audits (Roy et al. 2006, 2007). On the other
hand, some are increasingly questioning the portrayal
of RTI as ‘a magic wand’ and the extent of success it
is able to deliver.1 Others have also expressed doubts
over the use of RTI by the poor and marginalised
groups due to the complexity of the legal process
involved.2
Recently there has also been a debate about the
capacity of poorer groups to represent themselves and
make claims on the government. Some scholars argue
that poorer groups have limited capacity to
(collectively) represent their claims, or to present a
policy or reform agenda that would address issues of
basic rights, which explains why they have to rely
either on ‘self-provisioning’ or on elected political
representatives for the same (Harriss 2005). Others
also argue that India’s ‘otherwise vibrant and
diversified’ civil society has been ‘unsuccessful’ in
combating ‘forms of corruption’ that
‘disproportionately afflict the poor’ (Jenkins and Goetz
2003). The question for this article then is: to what
extent can the RTI be used to advance the claims of
the poor and make government accountable?
In the following sections, I attempt to address some
of these concerns with the RTI. I argue that a set of
activists have used the RTI successfully to mobilise
poor people and used information to generate
awareness through the media, as a way of making
government accountable. To make this argument, I
use the case of Parivartan, a Delhi-based citizens
group working on issues of corruption and
accountability. Parivartan has spearheaded the use of
RTI as a tool to expose corruption in government-
run programmes in urban areas.
In 2001, Parivartan mobilised residents of low-
income residential settlements, slums and squatter
settlements and made use of the Delhi Right to
Information Act (RTI) to access information on the
implementation of the Public Distribution System
(PDS), a government programme for ensuring basic
food-grains at affordable prices for the poor. The
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RTI-based records exposed the diversion of food-
grains taking place. Simultaneously, Parivartan was
able to get the system of public scrutiny of PDS
records institutionalised through collective social
action and the support of sympathetic bureaucrats.
This article is based on fieldwork conducted in
2003–5, as part of the Delhi PDS Campaign. The
article also relies on series of interviews conducted in
2006–7 with academics, government officials and
activists, as well as primary and secondary data
available on the PDS. The article continues with two
main sections: Section 2 begins with a literature
review on accountability in Delhi. The aim of this
section is to situate the Parivartan case and the use of
RTI in the debates around different types of
accountability: horizontal, vertical and/or societal.
Section 3 will outline the history of the PDS:
programme inception in the 1970s, the change in
policy since 1990 onwards, and a summary of the
main debates around this change; followed by a
detailed analysis of the Delhi PDS Campaign with the
focus on Parivartan. This is followed by the conclusions.
2 Accountability and associational activity in Delhi
In this article, I limit my discussion on accountability
to Schedler’s (1999) concepts of ‘answerability’ and
‘enforceability’. Through the use of RTI, information
that should ordinarily be available, became accessible.
But what are the implications of disclosure of such
information? Such disclosure allows citizens to take
steps against public agency’s actions that are deemed
unacceptable, such as diversion of food designated
for the poor. Further action in the form of
enforcement against the defaulting agencies requires
more than traditional mechanisms of ‘enforceability’
– ‘sanctioning authorities’. To bring about the
institutionalisation of effective mechanisms of
enforceability requires consistent demands by
organised social actors. Social mobilisation is not
easy, and RTI by itself does not enable collective
action, it does however create an enabling
environment for mobilisation. The Parivartan case
discussed in Section 3 will show that in the context
where traditional mechanisms of accountability can
be ineffective and insufficient, a movement for new
forms of ‘societal accountability’ can be successful
and, under certain circumstances, institutionalised.
2.1 Forms of accountability
For democracy to function effectively, it is necessary
that the institutions and its representatives that are
entrusted with the task of maintaining the checks and
balance do so effectively. Therefore, it is essential that
effective accountability mechanisms are put in place
to check the misuse of power by government
agencies and their representatives. Focusing on such
mechanisms of preventing and redressing the misuse
of power by government agencies and public officials,
Schedler (1999) defines accountability as the ‘two-
dimensional concept’ of ‘answerability’ (public officials
are answerable for or must explain their actions) and
‘enforceability’ (any action of a public official can be
called into question and punished for any act of
omission or commission by a sanctioning authority).
Traditional mechanisms of accountability seem to
encounter numerous problems and stumbling blocks
at different levels of government agencies.
Organisation of bureaucracy renders accountability
mechanisms inefficient for several reasons:
z Complicity between higher and lower levels of
government makes it difficult for the
‘answerability’ and ‘enforceability’ concept to have
the desired monitoring effect.
z Very often there is no way of effectively ensuring
that the ‘sanctioning authority’ can function
independently and actually punish erring public
officials.
z Mechanisms adopted by sanctioning authorities,
like vigilance committees, grievance redressal cells,
etc., are not time bound and can be easily
manipulated by vested interests.
The mechanisms of accountability existing within the
institution of elected representatives are also highly
inefficient because:
z Despite being free and fair, elections are generally
lacking of issue-based platforms.
z Every five years, citizens are able to hold ‘elected’
officials accountable, but due to limitations of
time, citizens are unable to call back elected
representatives if they fail to deliver on their
promises.
This article argues that the traditional mechanisms of
accountability are proving to be insufficient in certain
contexts, and therefore new mechanisms of ‘societal
accountability’ are becoming popular among social
movements. Through such mechanisms, social
movements can carry out campaigns, build public
opinion and put pressure on elected governments to
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face the issue and to duly respond to the citizens’
demands. ‘Societal accountability’ is another form of
vertical accountability; it is non-electoral yet vertical,
involving citizen associations, social movements and
the media with diverse strategies: (1) to monitor
government functioning and actions of public
officials; (2) to expose wrongdoings of the
government; and (3) to activate horizontal
accountability agencies (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz
2006; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000).
Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006) argue that societal
accountability is ‘activated on demand’, applying both
institutional tools (such as legal action) as well as
non-institutional tools (such as social mobilisation,
media exposure) to achieve its objectives. This pro-
accountability mechanism, they argue, compensates
for the built-in deficits in the traditional mechanisms
(Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000). Actors using
societal accountability mechanisms perform
watchdog functions; they rely on the ‘intensity of
their claims’ and on the impact on public opinion.
Public exposure incurs ‘reputational costs’ and helps
in putting things on the public agenda, consequently
making the ‘administration more responsive to
societal needs’. One of the limitations of societal
accountability has been its ability to impose ‘symbolic
sanctions’ and not have ‘mandatory affects’
(Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006). As Mainwaring
(2003) puts it: accountability ‘cannot exist with no
sanctioning power’. Yet Peruzzotti and Smulovitz
(2006) claim that the intensity and visibility of voice
through ‘symbolic sanctions’ can have ‘material
consequences’; therefore it is unfair to dismiss
societal accountability mechanisms altogether.
Societal accountability operates in a decentralised,
piecemeal manner, with varied purposes and varied
tools, and with a focus on policies or politicians
whom societal actors seek to control.
2.2 Representation, associational activity and the
urban poor in Delhi
Studies on civil society in India tend to agree that
Delhi offers a particularly barren landscape with a
few active organisations to speak. Those that do exist
have few links to poor communities (Houtzager et al.
2002; Harriss 2005).
Recent studies on participation by and representation
of the urban poor vis-à-vis service provisioning suggest
a kind of reluctance on the part of the government to
improve the access of the poor to basic services. One
study argues that ‘it is unclear whether the needs
being highlighted genuinely reflect the priorities of
slum residents, or … get inadvertently replaced or
otherwise by the priorities of Government or NGOs,
in a hurry to show results’ (Pande and Sudarshan
2007). Houtzager et al. (2002) argue that traditional
forms of political representation available to the poor
through trade unions and political parties that were
‘concerned with the achievement of social and
economic rights’ are now being replaced by emerging
new patterns based on ‘other sorts of social networks
and goals’.
Yet, other studies point towards a possible ‘decline
of state responsiveness to social claims’. Under such
conditions the poor either engage in ‘self-
provisioning’ or rely on political parties and their
representatives to access services or redress
grievances (Harriss 2005). A recent study in Delhi
concludes that, despite a high level of collective
action in Delhi, the poor still most commonly chose
to approach political parties to represent themselves
and to tackle their problems. And ‘there is little
indication, in fact, of the existence of any other
significant collective actions in the worlds of poor
people’. The same study also argues that there is an
evidence of ‘informal collective action’ with the
poor engaging in ‘self-provisioning’, and ‘collectively’
solving problems through their friends, families and
neighbours (Harriss 2005). Pande and Sudarshan
(2007) speak of ‘need-based negotiations’, where
the poor rely heavily on political representatives as
the initial forum for redressal or service provisioning.
It appears therefore, that in India as a whole, the
needs and interests of the poor are now being met
more effectively through the ‘new politics’ of social
movements, rather than trade union, burgeoning
non-governmental organisations (NGOs),
associations of civil society, or indeed political
parties.
3 The PDS in India
The PDS is India’s national food security programme;3
one of its many objectives is to make subsidised
food-grains, along with sugar and kerosene oil,
available to families ‘below the poverty line’ (BPL).
Government-run and managed, the PDS performs
two main functions:
z maintaining price of grains stability, through the
implementation of a minimum support price paid
to farmers
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z making available grains, such as wheat and rice, as
well as other commodities, like sugar and
kerosene oil, to food-grain cardholders.
Under PDS, there are three types of cardholders4
that are serviced at subsidised rates.
Since the Second World War, the PDS evolved from
a wartime food-graining system, started by the
British, to a welfare measure in 1950 with the onset
of planning. When it was started, the PDS was
implemented largely in urban areas with limited
extension to rural areas (only those rural areas that
are considered to have food deficit get included in
the programme). Later crop failures, food shortages,
price fluctuations and the droughts of 1965–6 and
1966–7 led to the expansion of the PDS into a
universal access programme (Swaminathan 2000).
Between the 1970s and 1990s, the PDS was viewed
as a component of the government’s strategy to
alleviate poverty. The growth of domestic agricultural
production allowed for further expansion of the
PDS, as well as other food-for-work type of
employment programmes. The network of fair price
shops5 grew, and special schemes to supply food for
the poor were also introduced (Swaminathan 2000).
But the gap between the policy design and its actual
implementation on the ground has been a subject of
debate for over a decade.
According to Kabra and Ittyerah (1992), there were
several problems with the PDS. The levels of supplies
of food-grains under the PDS at times were not
adequate to keep the fair price shops well stocked
and to replenish commodities. As a result, consumers
were ‘unable to look forward to regular supplies
through the PDS channels’. Further, entitlements
provided under the PDS were lower than the
consumption levels warranted on the basis of
nutritional norms, since the PDS was aimed at
providing the ‘essential’, not ‘total’, consumption
level of the poor. The PDS supplies also reached the
fair price shops late, thereby giving the shop owners
a ‘ready alibi’ for their inability to supply the
cardholders according to their entitlements.
Kabra and Ittyerah (1992) also argue that ‘universal
coverage often reduces the entitled scale and
availability to such an extent, that a large section of
consumers voluntarily exclude themselves from the
system’. Large-scale voluntary exclusion by the
‘relatively better off’ and ‘vocal’ section of the
population provides ‘ideal conditions for the diversion
of PDS supplies’. This not only results in reducing
access for the poor, but also in their ‘involuntary
exclusion due to large scale diversion’ (Kabra and
Ittyerah 1992). The PDS was criticised for its inability
to serve the poorer population, ‘urban bias’,
negligible coverage in parts of the country populated
predominantly by the rural poor, and lack of
transparent and accountable arrangements for
delivery (Planning Commission of India 2007).
Since the beginning of the 1990s, two major
changes have been introduced in the PDS: the
Revised PDS (RPDS) and the Targeted PDS (TPDS).
This article focuses on the second major change. In
1997, the government introduced a new programme
with a focus on the poor with income-based
targeting – the TPDS. The TPDS was an attempt to
target households using an income criterion (using
the income poverty line to demarcate ‘poor’ and
‘non-poor’ households) with the objective of
streamlining the PDS. The programme was designed
around provisioning of basic goods, such as food-
grains, sugar and kerosene oil on a dual pricing basis.
A two-tier card system was introduced in order to
represent a distinction between above and below
poverty line cardholders.
This change from a universal access system to a
targeted programme generated a series of debates
around such issues as: abilities of the poor to access
PDS, corruption and lack of accountability in the
delivery system, and problems with identifying and
servicing BPL households. Some scholars argued that
targeting was a direct result of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) promoted structural
adjustment programmes, which India began
following after the economic liberalisation of the
1990s (Swaminathan 2000).
The government’s main argument for introducing
targeting was the reduction of the food subsidy
budget, which was achieved through a rise in the
central issue price (CIP)6 under the TPDS. After a
series of debates within the coalition partners, the
government reached a compromise to marginally
enhance the CIP and make 10kg of wheat and rice
available to the BPL households at subsidised rates.
The move was criticised and seen as a weakening of
the PDS, which was considered to act as a social
safety net for the poor (Muralidharan and Mahalingam
1997). It was argued that 10kg per household was far
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below the total household requirement of 30kg, and
therefore the poor would inevitably end up buying
the remaining quantity in the open market, thus
defeating the purpose of targeting. Some authors
claimed that ‘for all the agitation over the food
subsidy burden entailed by the TPDS, its actual
benefit to the poor was no more than marginal’
(Muralidharan and Mahalingam 1997).
Other criticisms of the policy change were the
continual inability to address problems of access by
the poor, by not ensuring that the poor could access
their food-grain quota in instalments (even though
provisions for this do exist under the TPDS) (Jishnu
2004). Further, the TPDS had no inbuilt measures to
ensure that the deserving households benefited from
the programme; and there have been serious errors
with setting the income criterion and identification
of BPL families by state governments. As a result,
several deserving households have not been issued
BPL cards because a certain section of the
population – ‘destitute households’ – tends to remain
‘socially invisible’ from most development
programmes and welfare schemes. According to
Dreze, the PDS became ‘largely a mechanism of
disposing of surplus grains’ rather than addressing
‘issues of chronic poverty, malnutrition, starvation
and hunger’ (Jishnu 2004).
Even at present, the real situation on the ground is
far from the TPDS as envisaged, reflecting huge gaps
in the implementation of the programme. It has
been argued that the introduction of targeting not
only left the initial set of PDS problems unresolved,
but might have further exacerbated them. Targeting
the PDS to a section of the population ‘below the
poverty line’ has brought about both inclusion and
exclusion errors: those deserving have been left out,
and those that were better placed to exploit the
system have gained access (Swaminathan 2000).
In 2001, the dysfunctional PDS became a subject of
national debate, as people in parts of India died of
starvation and hunger, while approximately 50
million tons of food-grains were rotting in the Food
Corporation of India godowns (stores). A group of
activists filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) against
the Government of India, and soon afterwards a
national network of campaigns by organisations and
individuals came together to form the Right to Food
Campaign (2005)7 that took forward the issues of
food security, malnutrition, starvation, and women’s
and children’s food security. In Delhi, the RTI
prompted a two-year-long campaign that took up
the issue of corruption within the PDS. The next
part of this section discusses the Delhi PDS
Campaign in more detail.
3.1 Parivartan: a citizen’s collective against
corruption
Parivartan, by its own definition a ‘people’s
movement against corruption’, is an urban grassroots
organisation; six of its permanent working group
members are residents of a low-income
neighbourhood in east Delhi. Nine members
constitute a permanent working group along with an
informal group of like-minded people who work as
volunteers. Parivartan distinguishes itself from
conventional NGOs in that it accepts no institutional
funding (external or from within India) and does not
focus on service delivery. Parivartan’s organisational
form and ideology are close to another prominent
grassroots organisation, the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti
Sangathana (MKSS) from which it draws inspiration.8
The MKSS has pioneered the cause of transparency
and accountability in government functioning since
the late 1980s. It developed a political platform for
the rural poor and challenged the educated elite’s
perception of the poor as being illiterate and
therefore inarticulate. The RTI movement in India has
been led by the MKSS working with the poor –
farmers, workers and villagers. The MKSS was central
to shaping the movement’s discourse based on the
concept of transparency as related to truth, openness
and closely linked to basic survival and livelihood.
Parivartan used a number of MKSS’s strategies of
accessing information, organising public hearings and
carrying out public audits. However, the focus of
Parivartan campaigns shifted from the issues of
transparency to the issues of accountability and
corruption in government functioning.
Parivartan used the MKSS highly successful model of
jan sunwais, or public hearings, which involves three
stages:
z accessing information
z collectively analysing official information
z verifying the information through a process of
public hearings.
These hearings are presided over by an independent
panel and involve citizens, as well as government
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officials. Through this process of social/public audit, a
demystification of information previously considered
secret takes place and information is read out aloud
and in public, so that people can check for
discrepancies. For example, in some instances, people
found that government records showed they had
been accessing the PDS continuously, when in fact
they each time cardholders had gone to access the
grains they were entitled to, the shop had been
closed. As Jenkins and Goetz (2003) argue, ‘this
approach depends on the principle of collective and
very local verification of official accounts, as it is only
at the local level that the many small diversions of
funds, which go unnoticed in massive formal audits,
can be detected’.
When the MKSS began using jan sunwais to expose
corruption in number of localities, access to
information was extremely difficult in the absence of
the RTI. In Parivartan’s case, the task of using jan
sunwais was made easier because of the Delhi RTI,
which enabled access to official records.
3.2 The Delhi PDS Campaign
In 2002–3 Parivartan was working in a small low-
income settlement in east Delhi. Triveni, a low-
income resident of the settlement, came to
Parivartan with the complaint that she had been
unable to obtain her entitled food-grains from the
PDS shop for the last three months and wanted to
know what she could do. She was advised to file an
application under the RTI requesting copies of all
PDS records, including cash memos. Before the
information could arrive, Triveni was offered
Rs.20,000 and sacks of grain by the PDS shop
owner; if she took back her RTI application. Triveni
refused both the money and the sacks of grain, and
persisted with her RTI application. When the
information arrived, Triveni was shocked to learn
that, as per government records, she had been
getting grain from the PDS shop for the last three
months. Triveni is literate and can sign her own
name, so she was outraged to see thumbprints of
varying shapes and sizes against her name in the cash
memos, so she decided to file a complaint with the
Food and Civil Supplies Department.9
Simultaneously, using the RTI, Parivartan accessed
records for all fair price shops in that area and began
to analyse the information. Using the information
revealed in Triveni’s case, Parivartan started mobilising
neighbourhood residents; Triveni herself became
active in Parivartan. The media too became
interested and reported Triveni’s case; she was even
called for a television interview.
In August 2003, Parivartan organised a jan sunwai
and over 300 people from across Delhi filed RTI
applications to view their food-grain records. The fair
price shop owners were legally obligated to disclose
information, but they managed to obtain a stay order
from Delhi High Court, which in effect prohibited
Parivartan access to fair price shop records. It was
then argued that, although Parivartan was under the
stay order, for the remaining applicants the right to
view their records was not affected. Inspection of
official records began; applicants were assisted by
Parivartan volunteers in inspecting files and in
retrieving copies of documents/records. At the same
time, Parivartan started to expand their campaign,
reaching out to other slums and low-income
settlements, in order to find out the status of the
PDS in those settlements, to mobilise residents and
to generate awareness on the use of RTI.
As the campaign spread, there were reports of
violence against Parivartan’s volunteers, as well as
against applicants: there were incidents of physical
violence, and people were threatened and bribed,
compelled and cajoled to take back their RTI
applications. Some people withdrew, but many did not.
Those who accessed information reported a marked
change in the attitudes of the fair price shop owners.
By mid-December 2003, Parivartan had managed to
access information on fair price shops and kerosene oil
depots for the three settlements where it had begun
working intensively on the PDS issue. Information
from daily sale registers, stock position registers, and
copies of cash memos were analysed, collated and a
verification exercise was undertaken. Out of the 182
families surveyed, 142 families did not receive a single
grain of wheat and 167 families did not receive rice
during the month of June 2003. A total of 87 per
cent of wheat and 94 per cent of rice under the PDS
had been diverted and sold in the open market.
Soon the association of fair price shop owners
approached Parivartan with their concerns. They also
approached the local elected representative with a
plea to speak to the government and to lobby for
the increase in their commission under the PDS,
because the existing rate of commission for the shop
owners was too low to make any profit.
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In March 2004, another verification exercise was
undertaken in another locality in east Delhi. The 82
families surveyed were informed that there was an
improvement in delivery of grains under the PDS.
The effects of the PDS Campaign were felt in
different parts of the city, but two near fatal attacks
on Parivartan’s youngest member demonstrated both
the real power of the campaign, as well as the risks
involved in challenging organised networks of
corruption.
These attacks led to an announcement by the
residents that they would boycott a month’s quota
of food-grain and kerosene oil. The residents’
boycott included demands to access and to inspect
their food-grain records in the Food Commissioner
of Delhi’s office. They also wanted a clear
commitment from the Commissioner that if
discrepancies were to be found, then immediate
action would be taken against defaulting shop
owners and government officials. Throughout
February 2005, fair price shop owners individually
approached cardholders, requesting them to take
their grains, shops remained open at designated
times, and the local government officials carried out
periodical inspections, in some instances with video
cameras. At the end of the month, an inspection of
records revealed no discrepancies.
This led Parivartan to push for institutionalising the
system of public scrutiny of records. The Food
Commissioner, sympathetic to the demands of public
scrutiny of records, initiated the process on a pilot
basis in the areas where Parivartan was active.
Within a short period of time, it was scaled-up to
apply to all food and supply circles across Delhi. Two
Saturdays of every month were designated for public
viewing of food-grain records and for lodging
complaints. In the first few months of
operationalisation, five shop owners were suspended
in the east district of Delhi, and a district level officer
was issued a suspension letter, on the eve of his
retirement, informing him that an inquiry was
opened against the functioning of his circle office.
4 Conclusions
The case of Parivartan is significant for two reasons.
First, although the PDS Campaign in Delhi
spearheaded by Parivartan has not been able to
reform the entire system of distribution and delivery
under the PDS, it has however put Parivartan in a
position where it is now able to enter negotiations
around pubic policy. The process of disclosure of
information through the RTI also ‘establishes a
dialogic relationship between the accountable and
the accounting actors’. It makes both parties speak
and engages them both in public debate. To reach
this stage of debate or negotiation is only possible
once both parties are on an equal footing. This is a
form of ‘direct relations’ that allows a form of
‘societal accountability’, which seeks to ensure that
government meets its affirmative duty to act
(Houtzager et al. 2006). Such ‘direct relations’, it is
argued, are possible when citizens have ‘sufficient
legal and effective equality in their interaction with
public officials’. The use of RTI in the PDS in Delhi
demonstrates that with access to information,
citizens can begin to chip away at the inequality in
relations between classes and the government.
Second, it also highlights the potential for grassroots
organisations like the MKSS and Parivartan, in
combating corruption that directly affects the poor.
The use of RTI implies taking a confrontationist
stance against the government and Parivartan has
been able to do it successfully because it is neither
dependent on the government’s goodwill, nor in any
way vulnerable to intimidation, as it accepts no
foreign funding. Moreover, it is important to note
that the bureaucracy was supportive because the
Parivartan campaign was primarily directed against
the fair price shop owners,10 i.e. private actors
separate from the government. It might have been
harder to find support within the bureaucracy, had
its own lower levels been directly implicated in the
corruption.
Further, the PDS was not an arena of interest for
politicians for several reasons.11 Given the administrative
structure of the PDS and its functioning in Delhi,
elected representatives have no influence over the
administration of PDS, or over the distribution or
delivery of food-grains. Elected representatives seem
to have some control and influence in the issue of
licences for running ration shops and kerosene oil
depots under the PDS, for which they may even
receive a share of the profit. But perhaps it is precisely
such disinterest on the part of local representatives
that created an opportunity for Parivartan to campaign
over the issues that did not threaten them. The extent
to which they would allow NGOs to take over areas
that fall under their jurisdiction, and thus might
challenge their politics of patronage (such as
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aforementioned issues of access to water, sanitation,
refuse collection), is an open question.
In conclusion, it appears that the combination of
Parivartan (a dedicated grassroots activist
organisation) and the RTI was necessary for the
successful exercise of societal accountability: each
alone would not have been sufficient to achieve the
results that they did. The government’s role in
creating spaces for social actors/groups to participate
was critical. In the PDS Campaign, a sensitive
bureaucracy was the third element that enabled
Parivartan and the residents of the settlement to
produce the results.
The PDS Campaign has made only a small dent in a
larger system, which continues to be unfair and
unequal. In the long run, it is important to note that
there are still issues with the PDS that need to be
addressed. For example, the fair price shop owners
have no way of making money if they do not resort
to corruption, as the commission paid by the
government is simply not enough for survival. The
problems of access, errors of inclusion of non-poor
groups and exclusion of poor groups, corruption and
mismanagement are still prevalent in the PDS. But
the use of RTI has shown a way of dealing with
these problems. The real question is whether
institutionalisation can contribute to the
development of grassroots activism on a larger scale
– by other organisations in other localities? So far,
the signs are positive, but progress is slow. Following
the Parivartan experience, an organisation called
Satark Nagrik Sangathan (SNS)12 is carrying out
similar work in low-income settlements in the south
district of Delhi. Recently, another organisation in
the west and north-west district of Delhi assisted
100 slum-dwellers to file RTI applications to find out
why they were being denied their quota of food-
grains, despite holding valid cards.
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Notes
1 Comments made by participants at the IDS Project
‘Modes of Collective Action, Service Delivery and
Societal Regulation’, New Delhi, 1–2 March 2007.
2 Ibid.
3 The Food Corporation of India (FCI) set up in 1964
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Food
and Civil Supplies, is the sole central implementing
agency in charge of procurement, storage,
transport and distribution of food commodities.
State governments purchase the commodities
required for distribution from the FCI and make
them available to the fair price shops for
distribution to cardholders. There is a large
network of fair price shops across the country in
both rural and urban areas. They are licensed by
the government and are privately owned. The
State Food and Civil Supplies department in each
state is responsible for implementing, monitoring
and enforcing legal provisions relating to delivery
of food commodities.
4 Depending on the card, each household is
entitled to 35kg of wheat and rice and 1,200g of
sugar per unit (unit = family member whose name
is displayed on the card). The three types of cards
under the PDS are, above poverty line (APL),
below poverty line (BPL) and Antodaya Anna
Yojana (AAY); in 2000, the AAY was introduced
under the TPDS as a subcategory to BPL. The
APL cardholders are issued grains at a price closer
to the market rate, while the BPL and AAY
cardholders receive the same quality/quantity of
grains, at a subsidised rate, in which the AAY is
further subsidised (at Rs.2/kg for wheat and
Rs.3/kg for rice). The AAY is a scheme under the
TPDS targeted to the poorest of the poor; to
‘provide food-based assistance to destitute
households’; and other items are accessed at
further subsidised rates for BPL cardholders.
5 Also known as ration shops; these are privately
owned, with the responsibility of distributing
grains, sugar and kerosene oil. Licenses for
running a ration shop or a kerosene oil depot is
issued by the government.
6 The prices at which the Food Corporation of India
(FCI) sells grain for the PDS to State governments.
7 A Brief Introduction to the Campaign,
www.righttofoodindia.org/campaign/campaign.html
8 The MKSS is a grassroots organisation of mainly
poor people based in Rajasthan’s economically
underdeveloped Rajsamand district. The MKSS has
been crucial to the passage of the RTI in India. Its
interest in the RTI arose from its work in the late
1980s and early 1990s on livelihood issues,
particularly the failure of the state government to
enforce minimum-wage regulations on
employment-generation programmes in drought-
prone areas. This generated belief that access to
official documents was an essential part of the
struggle to demand accountability from local
authorities (Jenkins and Goetz 2003).
9 The nodal department in the Delhi government,
in charge of implementing the PDS in Delhi.
10 The delivery of sugar and kerosene oil under the
PDS takes place through a network of fair price
shops (FPS) and kerosene oil depots (KOD).
11 In fact, it is the fair price shop owners who
approached the elected representatives to
influence bureaucrats, as was evident in the
Parivartan case – to first get a stay order from the
Delhi High Court barring inspection of official
records, and then to seek audience with the Delhi
State Food Minister, through the regional Party
head, to complain about Parivartan.
12 SNS means Vigilant Citizens’ Collective. SNS
works in a slum settlement in South Delhi and
actively uses RTI in matters related to the PDS
and other services for the poor.
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